Deals with one of the most critical business issues of the century, the question of corporate responsibility. The author reconstructs and critically evaluates the arguments for the maximisation of profits, versus those to be found in the broader context of increased social responsibility.

This paper revisits the Pinto case not merely for the purpose of demythologizing the case, but as an opportunity to examine the broader issue of the logic of blame, the ascription of legal and moral responsibility. Three issues are addressed in the contexts of fault and liability in tort, criminal liability and product liability: 1) To what extent can judgments of moral wrongdoing or blame be inferred from legal judgments? 2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of attempting to model (...) moral arguments upon legal ones? and, 3) What is the nature and role of judgments of risk evaluation in legal and moral judgments? (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Feinberg's “methodological individualism” French and his critics Conclusion.

Since ought implies can, i.e., one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do, the question of corporate responsibility cannot be discussed intelligibly without an inquiry into the range of corporate or managerial discretion. Hence, the moral relevance of a theory of the firm. Within classical or neo-classical economic theory, for instance, firms which act other than to maximize profit are eliminated. They cannot do otherwise, and thus either have no obligations at all or only the duty to maximize (...) profit. The thesis of the Managerial Revolution, if true, establishes only that management is free from direct stockholder control. By asserting that corporations have responsibilities to do other than maximize profit, philosophers assume a wide degree of managerial discretion, without considering recent developments in the theory of the firm which suggest that new incentives and constraints radically restrict managerial liberty in a capitalist society. (shrink)

This paper revisits the Pinto case not merely for the purpose of demythologizing the case, but as an opportunity to examine the broader issue of the logic of blame, the ascription of legal and moral responsibility. Three issues are addressed in the contexts of fault and liability in tort, criminal liability and product liability: 1) To what extent can judgments of moral wrongdoing or blame be inferred from legal judgments? 2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of attempting to model (...) moral arguments upon legal ones? and, 3) What is the nature and role of judgments of risk evaluation in legal and moral judgments? (shrink)

The prevailing opinion in our culture is that bribery is in principle wrong. I challenge that view and offer an analysis that suggests that bribery is a morally neutral concept. The analysis closely parallels the legal notions, suggesting that this analysis may have a firm grounding in our own tradition in spite of the prevailing views. To bribe someone is to offer something of value to another with the intent of inducing an action that is contrary to the positional duties (...) of the office or role of that other person. Whether offering or accepting a bribe is morally correct or incorrect, then, depends entirely upon whether the relevant positional duties have moral backing, all things considered. One virtue of the analysis is that it provides a definition that allows for a cross-cultural comparison that does not impose the standards of one society on those of another but allows for moral judgment. To determine whether a Japanese official has accepted a bribe, for example, one must determine the positional duties of the official as defined in that culture. The analysis also reveals why most believe bribery to be prima facie wrong. This is explained historically by the fact that the concept originally applied exclusively to positional duties in the judicial system, where all believed it to be morally unjustified to transgress duties of impartiality, etc. Finally, the analysis suggests that beliefs about the immorality of commercial bribery rest on the assumption that the positional duties of corporate managers and agents are to abide by the fictitious free-market rules and that the rules of the free market are morally justified. (shrink)

Although Friedman's The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits is widely read, the central argument is rarely identified. Stone's discussion of Friedman in Where the Law Ends, is often used as a companion piece. Stone claims that the most important argument in Friedman is the Polestar argument but never succeeds in explaining what it is. This paper shows that Friedman's position must be read in the context of his theory of political economy, and that at least four distinct (...) utilitarian arguments are required to account for his views. Specifically, Friedman relies upon what I describe as Realistic Rule Utilitarianism in which utility is understood in terms of actual preferences. The weaknesses of this theory are then explained. (shrink)

In this paper I review the dispute over DeGeorge's analysis of the issue of the ethical responsibilities of engineers in large organizations. I argue that this issue is no different than the question of the ethical responsibilities of any other relevantly situated employee because engineers have no special duty to hold paramount the safety of the public distinct from that of others. I demonstrate how critics like Mankin, James, and Curd and May have misread and misinterpreted DeGeorge's position and his (...) argument. I then identify a serious logical problem in DeGeorge, unnoticed by critics, but conclude by defending the spirit of DeGeorge's approach. That spirit recognizes the limitations of attempting to provide necessary and sufficient conditions in response to many questions in applied philosophy. (shrink)

After examining Frederick's charge in his recently published Values, Nature, and Culture in the American Corporation that philosophers and others in the field of business ethics and business and society ignore nature and technology, the paper investigates Frederick's attempt to articulate and defend a New Normative Synthesis (NNS). Since the NNS is the result of a synthesis between Frederick's theory of business values and the body of principles in business ethics, I focus on the nature of each component, the nature (...) of the synthesis, and the nature of the resulting NNS itself. Inquiry reveals serious questions about the explanatory value of the theory of business values as a descriptive theory, as well as serious questions about the defense of the theory as normative theory. The analysis also discloses several possible interpretations of the NNS. (shrink)